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IS THE DECK STACKED AGAINST
INTERNET GAMBLING? A COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REGULATION
Nicholas Bamman*
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has fundamentally changed the face of gambling.
With the click of a mouse, a person can wager money in real time
from anywhere in the world.1 Over the past two decades, millions
of customers have used online casinos to play poker, blackjack,
and other games.2 To some, Internet gambling is a harmless
pastime, but to others the explosion of Internet gambling represents
a financial and social threat to their community.3
Since its inception in the mid-1990s, Internet gambling has
quickly become the highest grossing internet-based industry.4 In
fact, Internet gambling has boasted an average annual growth of
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1
See, e.g., PARTYGAMING, http://www.partygaming.com (last visited Aug.
24, 2010).
2
See, e.g., How Many People Gamble Online?, CASINO BONUSES,
http://www.bonusbomb.com/gambling/how-many-people-gamble-online.html
(last visited Aug. 24, 2010) (“Although the exact size of the online gaming
industry is unknown, the current number of online gamblers is in the millions,
and analysts agree that industry growth is rapid.”).
3
E.g., NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, NATIONAL
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, ch. 7, at 7-3 (1999),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/7.pdf [hereinafter
NGISC, ch. 7].
4
Dana Gale, The Economic Incentive Behind the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 533 (2009).
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more than 20%,5 culminating in an estimated $24 billion of
revenue in 2010.6 Despite recent legislation designed to curtail the
industry, Americans still comprise an estimated 25% of the global
market.7
Since the birth of Internet gambling, the Department of Justice
prosecuted online gambling executives pursuant to antigambling
laws written before the advent of the Internet.8 As a result,
American entrepreneurs initiated Internet gambling companies
overseas.9 As money flows directly to Internet gambling
companies abroad, Internet gambling drains billions of dollars
annually from the American economy.10 Indeed, the United States
derives no tangible national benefit, but suffers all of the social
costs, of Internet gambling.11
In 2006, Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”) to address these concerns.12 The
UIGEA prohibits American financial institutions from processing
fund transfers to Internet gambling companies and their affiliates,
thereby eliminating the funding for Internet gambling.13 Under this
framework, American financial institutions carry the burden of
policing these Internet gambling fund transfers.14 However, the
5

Anne Von Lehman, American Entrepreneurs and Internet Gambling: Are
the Odds Stacked Against Them?, 3 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 135, 137–39 (2008).
6
See Rich Cholodofsky, Internet Gambling Perplexes Officials, TRIBLIVE
(Jan. 15, 2006), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_413842.html.
7
Eric Pfanner, A New Chance for Online Gambling in the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/technology/internet/
27iht-gamble.html?scp=1&sq=A%20New%20Chance%20for%20Online%20
Gambling%20in%20the%20U.S&st=cse.
8
See infra Part I.A.
9
See Von Lehman, supra note 5, at 137.
10
Gale, supra note 4, at 547.
11
See Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition: The Federal
Government’s Approach to Internet Gambling, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
162, 166 (2009) (describing addiction and underage gambling as social costs of
online gambling). See also infra Part II.B.
12
See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §
5361(a) (West 2010). Other principal concerns included debt collection
problems for the consumer credit industry and money laundering. Id.
13
See id. § 5363.
14
Id.
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UIGEA does not criminalize Internet gambling at the customer
level either by fine or incarceration.15
To evaluate whether any legislation is beneficial to the United
States, it is necessary to scrutinize the legislation’s costs and
benefits—both economic and social.16 To the extent benefits
exceed costs, the legislation bestows a net benefit to the United
States. When there is more than one legislative option, the costbenefit analysis of each option must be compared against one
another. The option that bestows the largest net benefit is the
legislative most favorable to the United States.
In applying this theory to gambling law, a cost-benefit analysis
of the UIGEA alone provides minimal insight. While the UIGEA
may bestow a net benefit to the United States over a complete
absence of legislation, it is impossible to know whether the
UIGEA has provided the largest net benefit possible absent a
comparison to other legislative options. Therefore, this Note will
compare the costs and benefits of the UIGEA with the Internet
Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act17 (“Regulation Bill”) proposed by Representative Barney
Frank and the Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement
Act18 (“Taxation Bill”) proposed by Representative James
McDermott (collectively “Proposed Bills”). These Proposed Bills
operate in tandem to create a framework to license, regulate, and
tax Internet gambling. This Note will analyze the costs and
benefits of the UIGEA compared with the costs and benefits of the
Proposed Bills. The results of that analysis should indicate that the
Proposed Bills bestow a larger net benefit to the United States than
the UIGEA.
15

See id. §§ 5361–67.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC REASONING, 3–21
(6th ed. 2003), for an in depth discussion and analysis of the legal economic
analysis. For the foundation to the theory, see generally Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For the purposes of this Note,
the theory behind law and economics need not be scrutinized thoroughly. This
Note attempts a comparative analysis, not a quantitative one.
17
Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. (2009).
18
Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R.
2268, 111th Cong. (2009).
16
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Part I of this Note explores the current state of American
Internet gambling legislation. Part II examines the costs and
benefits of the UIGEA. Part III examines the costs and benefits of
the Proposed Bills. Part IV explores potential improvements to the
Proposed Bills. Finally, the conclusion weighs the costs and
benefits of the Proposed Bills against those of the UIGEA.
I. EXISTING GAMBLING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
WHAT’S THE DEAL?
Previous legislation failed to curtail Internet gambling in part
because Internet gambling reaches consumers in a nontraditional
manner.19 To wager on the Internet, customers must deposit money
into an online gambling account.20 Before the UIGEA limited
deposit method options, Internet gamblers funded accounts with
credit cards, checks, e-checks, money orders, “e-wallets,”21 or
other transaction devices.22 After funding an account, a customer
could wager on casino games such as blackjack, roulette, poker, or
even backgammon.23 To withdraw or cash out, customers used the
same process in reverse, eventually receiving a credit to his or her
bank account.24
Internet gambling sites have accepted deposits, processed
wagers, and transmitted payouts without ever physically touching
American soil, which has created enormous jurisdictional problems
19

Internet gambling companies never have to submit to U.S. jurisdiction
and there is no physical product to regulate.
20
See, e.g., Playing with Real Money, POKERSTARS, http://www.poker
stars.com/poker/real-money/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2010) (providing instructions
on current valid methods depending on the customer’s country of residence).
21
E-wallets are third party transfer companies, such as PayPal. See, e.g.,
Top Ten Things to Know About Pay Pal, PAYPAL, https://personal.
paypal.com/cgi-bin/marketingweb?cmd=_render-content&content_ID=
marketing_us/PayPal_FAQ (last visited Sept. 2, 2010). PayPal acts as an
intermediary in all types of transactions over the Internet—not just gambling,
and allows customers to make purchases at several online vendors while limiting
their financial information to just one company. Id.
22
See POKERSTARS, supra note 20.
23
See, e.g., PARTYGAMING, supra note 1.
24
See, e.g., Cashout Policy, POKERSTARS, http://www.pokerstars.com/
poker/real-money/cashouts/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
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for American law enforcement officials.25 In general, these
companies have paid taxes and abided by their respective country’s
Internet gambling laws.26 Thus, foreign governments are unlikely
to extradite executives for prosecution in the United States.27
A. American Gambling Law Prior to the UIGEA
The interplay between federal, state, and tribal gambling law
has created a confusing array of rules. Historically, the federal
government left gambling regulation to the states and only passed
legislation to protect state sovereignty.28 Although state gambling
laws vary drastically, all fifty states except Hawaii and Utah have
some form of legal gambling.29 Even within state boundaries,
however, laws may differ due to sovereign tribal legislation.30
For example, the federal Wire Act of 1961 prohibits
bookmakers31 from taking bets in states where gambling is illegal
25

See Michael J. Vener, Internet Gambling Law: Is Prohibition Really
Good Policy?, 15 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 199, 211–14 (2008).
26
See id. at 214.
27
See id. Gambling companies provide large benefits for safe haven
countries. For example, Antiguan gambling companies provide millions in
government revenue and employ nearly 5% of its 68,000 citizens. Katherine A.
Valasek, Winning the Jackpot: A Framework for Successful International
Regulation of Online Gambling and the Value of the Self-Regulating Entities,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 753, 768 (2007).
28
See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §
5362(10)(A) (West 2010) (defining gambling by existing state and federal law);
Interstate Wire Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084(a) (West 2010) (protecting states that
prohibit gambling by disallowing wagers transmitted via the telephone wire).
See also Jason A. Miller, Don’t Bet on This Legislation: The Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act Places a Bigger Burden on Financial Institutions
than Internet Gambling, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 185, 189 (2008) (explaining the
Congress’ intent behind these laws.).
29
Miller, supra note 28, at 188–89; see Ian Urbina, States Face Drop in
Gambling Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/10/us/10gambling.html?hp (noting that forty-two states have state run
lotteries, twelve have commercial casinos, twenty-nine states have Indian
casinos, and twelve have “racinos”—horseracing with slots machines and other
gambling games.).
30
See Indian Gaming Regulation, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–21 (West 2010).
31
A bookmaker is “a person who determines odds and receives bets on the
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and delivering those bets via the telephone “wire” to states where
the bets are legal.32 Congress did not want legal gambling in one
state to effectively legalize gambling in all states.33 The
Department of Justice has taken the position that the Wire Act
covers Internet gambling, although the Act makes no mention of
the Internet or electronic communications.34 Indeed, the text of the
statute and court decisions have limited the Wire Act to apply only
to sports betting.35 Consequently, law enforcement officials
required a regulatory mechanism that would enable them to
prosecute online gambling executives who do not specialize in
sports betting.
However, it has never been Congress’s intention to ban Internet
gambling entirely.36 Presumably, if Internet gambling presents a
net loss to the United States, then all forms of Internet gambling
should be banned. Instead, the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978
(IHA), enacted to “further the horseracing and legal off-track
betting industries in the United States,” openly promotes domestic
horserace gambling over the Internet.37 As amended in 2000, the
IHA protects off-track wagers placed “via telephone or other

outcome of events, esp. sports events.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
32
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084 (West 2010).
33
See Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal Wire Wager Act, GAMBLING LAW US,
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/wire-act.htm (last visited Sept.
1, 2010) (stating that the Wire Act was intended to help states in enforcing their
respective laws on gambling and bookmaking).
34
Valasek, supra note 27, at 757.
35
Compare United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (using the
Wire Act to prosecute an Internet sports gambling company executive),
with Thompson v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002)
(prohibiting reliance on the Wire Act where plaintiffs failed to allege defendants
engaged in Internet sports gambling). Under this interpretation, the Wire Act
could not be used to prosecute executives of online poker companies. See
Thompson, 313 F.3d at 262.
36
See Interstate Horseracing, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001–3007 (West 2010)
(permitting horserace gambling over the Internet). See also Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363 (West 2010) (prohibiting
American financial institutions from processing fund transfers to Internet
gambling companies unless an exemption, such as horserace gambling, applies).
37
15 U.S.C.A. § 3001.
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electronic media.”38 The amendment essentially legalizes and
regulates domestic Internet gambling on horse races, and prohibits
foreign competition.39 Had the UIGEA not specifically carved out
an exception for horseracing,40 this lucrative industry would have
been eliminated.41 As these two examples demonstrate, Congress
sometimes takes conflicting positions with respect to Internet
gambling legislation.
B. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
Legislators attached the UIGEA to the enormously popular
SAFE Port Act,42 which passed by an overwhelming majority in
the house and unanimously in the Senate.43 Although Internet
gambling and traditional gambling offer the same games, the
UIGEA’s Congressional findings note that there are social costs
particular to Internet gambling.44 Congress further noted that
“Internet gambling is a growing cause of debt collection problems
for insured depository institutions and the consumer credit
38

Id. § 3002(3).
See, e.g., Yevgeniya Roysen, Taking Chances: The United States’ Policy
on Internet Gambling and its International Implications, 26 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 873, 878, 882–86 (2009).
40
31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(10)(B)(iii).
41
See infra Part II.B.1. (describing the principal role this exemption played
in America’s World Trade Organization dispute, resulting in billions of dollars
of sanctions and trade concessions).
42
Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West
2010) [hereinafter SAFE Port Act]. The SAFE Port Act was passed to increase
port security in response to threats of terrorism. H.R. REP. NO. 109-347, at 1
(2006). Its enormous popularity made it politically difficult to vote against the
bill.
43
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109347, 75 Stat. 1884.
44
See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §
5361(3) (West 2010). Empirical evidence for the social costs appear in the rather
out-of-date National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report. See NGISC,
ch.7, supra note 3 (stating, for example, that Internet gambling is less regulated
than casino resorts and will incur more social costs by permitting easier access
to gambling services). However, the Internet gambling landscape has changed
dramatically since 1999. This Note will use updated sources, where available, to
analyze new empirical data.
39
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industry.”45 Ironically, the financial institutions that provide these
services—the institutions that the law purports to protect—are
adamantly opposed to the legislation.46
The UIGEA prohibits financial transaction providers (“FTPs”)
from processing restricted transactions to Internet gambling sites.47
Restricted transactions encompass a broad swath of financial
interactions. “No person engaged in the business of betting or
wagering may knowingly accept, in connection with the
participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling:”48
(1) credit; (2) electronic transfers; (3) checks; and (4) other
financial instruments to be decided by future regulation.49 The
legislation places the onus of policing restricted transactions on
FTPs, and provides both civil and criminal penalties for
noncompliance.50 However, the UIGEA explicitly exempts certain
activities that would otherwise fall within the statute such as
fantasy sports, horseracing (but not dog racing), gambling on tribal

45

31 U.S.C.A. § 5361(c). The sparse congressional record on this issue also
cited underage gambling and problem gambling as increasing concerns. 152
CONG. REC. S11045-01 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl),
available at 2006 WL 3330257.
46
See Miller, supra note 28, at 201–04.
47
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5363–5364. FTPs are creditors, credit card issuers,
electronic fund transmitters, money transmitting businesses, payment
processors, stored value product transaction providers, electronic fund
processors, money transmitting services, or any other participant in a designated
payment system. Id. § 5362(4). In other words, the UIGEA affects many
American financial institutions.
48
Id. § 5363. A wager is defined as staking something of value on a
contest, sporting event or game subject to chance. Id. § 5362(1)(A). Some
advocates have questioned whether “a game subject to chance” includes games
such as poker, backgammon, scrabble, or other games that contain an element of
chance, but also require a great deal of skill. See Michael A. Tselnik, Check,
Raise, or Fold: Poker and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1617, 1643–50 (2007), for a more in-depth discussion on the
interplay between luck and skill.
49
31 U.S.C.A. § 5363. The Treasury has already passed the “future
regulation” mentioned in the section. See infra Part I.C.
50
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5365–5366. The UIGEA provides for injunctions against
companies permitting restricted transactions and/or up to five years
imprisonment. Id.
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lands, state lotteries, and investing in financial securities.51 These
exemptions provide critics with ammunition to question whether
the exceptions undermine the prohibition.52
To further complicate matters, the meaning of unlawful
Internet gambling itself is vague. The UIGEA defines Internet
gambling by cross-referencing existing federal, state and tribal
laws.53 As these laws vary enormously by jurisdiction, large FTPs
operating across the United States are responsible for knowing
fifty different state laws and adjusting their regulatory mechanisms
accordingly.54 FTPs have expressed particular concern because
judicial interpretations of federal law differ by jurisdiction.55 In
addition, absent specific lists of prohibited transactions, FTPs will
have to err on the side of compliance by over-restricting.56
Although the UIGEA limits FTPs’ civil liability for prohibiting
legitimate transactions on the mistaken, but reasonable belief, that
they were restricted transactions;57 FTPs have not been shy in
expressing their discontent.58
C. The Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling
Congress mandated that the Federal Reserve System and the
Department of the Treasury (“Agencies”) promulgate regulations
to implement the provisions of the UIGEA within 270 days of the
bill’s passage.59 On November 18, 2008, more than 700 days after
51

Id. § 5362(1)(E).
The drafters of the UIGEA likely realized that absent specific
exemptions, the legislation would prohibit many transactions Americans take for
granted. Stocks, mutual funds and financial securities would all be subject to
prohibition because they “stake something of value on an uncertain outcome.”
See id. § 5362(1)(A).
53
Id. § 5362(10)(A).
54
Miller, supra note 28, at 202.
55
See id.
56
For example, FTPs worry that over-restricting customers’ legitimate
transactions may hamper global competitiveness. See id. at 206–08.
57
31 U.S.C.A. § 5364(d)(2).
58
See Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 73 Fed. Reg.
69382, 69383 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 233) [hereinafter
PFUIG].
59
31 U.S.C.A. § 5364(a).
52
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former President Bush signed the UIGEA, the Agencies finally
passed the Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling
(“PFUIG”).60 This delay led critics to question whether the U.S.
government was fully committed to enforcing the UIGEA.61
Agency officials, on the other hand, blamed the delay on the vague
language of the UIGEA.62
The PFUIG requires FTPs to either: a) develop regulations that
are reasonably designed to prohibit restricted transactions, or; b)
comply with non-exclusive examples of regulation.63 The most
onerous provision requires FTPs to perform due diligence checks
for restricted transactions on new and existing customers.64
However, the PFUIG provides some latitude by permitting FTPs to
develop their own mechanisms to determine whether a commercial
customer presents a “minimal risk of engaging in an Internet
gambling business.”65 Although FTPs are exempt from performing
due diligence checks on some payment systems ostensibly due to
cost considerations,66 there are no exemptions for card systems and
money transmitting businesses.67 Commentators noted that the
exemptions for FTPs undermined the efficacy of the regulations.68
60

PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at 69382.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 28, at 196 (noting that “[t]his delay led
Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) to question the intentions of the Treasury
Department. ‘Are they going to be committed to enforcing this law,’ Brownback
asked, ‘and putting the personnel in place that it needs[?]’”).
62
Id.
63
See PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at § 5(a)–(b). Designated payment systems
include automated clearing house systems, card systems, check collection
systems, and money transmitting business. Id. § 3. The designated “Federal
functional regulator,” or if none exists, the Federal Trade Commission, will be
responsible for enforcement. Id. § 5(c).
64
See id. § 6(b). The PFUIG also provides non-exclusive examples of due
diligence that, if followed, carry a presumption of compliance. Id.
65
Id. § 6.
66
Miller, supra note 28, at 200.
67
Id. Card systems and money transmitting businesses include credit cards
and money delivery companies such as Western Union. See Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(11)(E) (West 2010).
68
See Kristina L. Perry, Afterword, The Current State of the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act and Recently Adopted Prohibition on
Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 29, 33–
61
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For example, banks are only required to perform due diligence
checks on commercial customers, but not for personal banking
customers.69 Furthermore, only the depository bank is responsible
for check collection systems.70 Therefore, the PFUIG would not
restrict an Internet gambling company’s payout to a customer via
check if the Internet gambling company used a foreign bank
account.
Pragmatically, FTPs will have trouble policing restricted
transactions as required by the PFUIG because entrepreneurs are
able to constantly open new foreign e-wallets to process Internet
gambling transactions.71 If an FTP refuses to process the
transactions of a specific e-wallet, that same e-wallet can
reincorporate under a different name, and elude detection in a
subsequent due diligence check.72
The government’s prosecution of Neteller and its executives is
a revealing example of just how difficult it can be to distinguish
between e-wallets that process restricted transactions and those that
do not. Neteller was an e-wallet from the Isle of Man, used for all
types of Internet purchases, although Internet gambling
transactions represented the bulk of Neteller’s revenue.73 In 2007,
the U.S. government arrested the Canadian owners of Neteller
while they were in the United States,74 and froze millions of dollars
of Neteller assets.75 After negotiations, Neteller agreed to pay a
34 (2008).
69
PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at § 6(e).
70
Id. § 4(b).
71
Miller, supra note 28, at 204–05.
72
Id. at 205.
73
Neteller Founders Arrested by FBI, Charged with Money Laundering,
POKER PAGES (Jan. 17, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.pokerpages.com/pokernews/news/neteller-founders-arrested-by-fbi-charged-with-money-laundering29454.htm. Customers used Neteller to confine their financial information to
just one merchant, decreasing opportunities for identity theft and fraud. See
Miller, supra note 28, at 204–05 (describing how individuals can use money
transmitting businesses to keep their financial information secure).
74
Christopher Costigan, NETeller Founders Arrested in U.S.,
GAMBLING911.COM (Jan. 15, 2007, 6:39 PM), http://www.gambling911.com/
NETeller-Founders-Arrested-011507.html.
75
Amy Calistri, Neteller Announces US Distribution Plans for Frozen
Funds, POKERNEWS (June 4, 2007, 6:39 PM), http://www.pokernews.com/
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$136 million penalty to the U.S. government to avoid
prosecution.76 Subsequently, the U.S. government unfroze
Neteller’s customers’ accounts.77 Thus, the U.S. government froze
the funds of millions of Neteller customers, although many of the
affected customers had never transferred a single dollar to an
Internet gambling account.78 The prosecution of Neteller illustrates
that the government itself has found it difficult to cast a net that
captures only restricted transactions. It is unreasonable to expect
FTPs to fare better.79
II. EFFECTS OF THE UIGEA AND PFUIG
To properly assess the net benefit of the UIGEA and PFUIG, it
is necessary to analyze the costs and benefits. Although this
analysis will not yield a precise numeric result, the benefits can be
compared categorically with the benefits of the Proposed Bills.
A. Benefits of the UIGEA and PFUIG
The UIGEA has slowed the explosive growth rate of Internet
gambling in the United States.80 Although private ownership of
foreign Internet gambling companies makes it difficult to estimate
the extent of the Internet gambling market, one study from H2
Gambling Capital81 estimated that the United States contributed $6
billion to the $22.6 billion global Internet gambling market in
news/2007/06/neteller-announces-plan-frozen-funds.htm.
76
Neteller Back in Business, EXTRA (July 26, 2007, 3:34 PM),
http://www.onlinecasinoextra.com
/casino_news_1010.html.
77
See id.
78
See TheDo, Neteller Update about Frozen Accounts, POCKET FIVES (Feb.
3, 2007, 9:15 PM), http://www.pocketfives.com/f7/neteller-update-about-frozenaccounts-65931/.
79
See Miller, supra note 28, at 204–05.
80
See Von Lehman, supra note 5, at 144.
81
H2 Gambling Capital is considered the leading Internet gambling
research company globally. See About H2, H2 GAMBLING CAPITAL,
http://www.h2gc.com/aboutus.php
(last
visited
Sept.
13,
2010).
PricewaterhouseCoopers derives its calculations from research performed by H2
Gambling Capital. See id.
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2008.82 By contrast, immediately preceding the passage of the
UIGEA in 2006, the United States contributed $3–4.2 billion to a
$6 billion market.83 Although Internet gambling revenue derived
from American customers increased in real terms, the UIGEA
approximately halved the percentage of American contribution to
the industry as a whole.84
In addition, the UIGEA provides social benefits by curbing
gambling addiction.85 Generally speaking, problem gamblers file
bankruptcy at 4–5 times the national rate and are more likely to
commit crimes and be arrested.86 Moreover, adolescents between
the ages of 12–18, who are more susceptible to gambling
addiction, have reported gambling by traditional means at a median
rate of 85%.87 If these traditional gambling statistics apply equally
to Internet gambling, legalization of Internet gambling could
increase social costs enormously because everyone in the United
States with an Internet connection will have access to gambling
services. Therefore, by increasing the difficulty of accessing
Internet gambling, the UIGEA should curb the rates of problem
gambling, underage gambling, and bankruptcies.88 The fewer

82

Pfanner, supra note 7.
See Von Lehman, supra note 5, at 139.
84
Id. These statistics may indicate that Internet gambling simply became
popular earlier in America than other countries. However, even if the UIGEA is
not responsible for the full slowdown, common sense dictates that the UIGEA at
least contributed.
85
See generally NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION,
NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, ch. 5 (1999),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf (describing how
“problem gamblers” are “susceptible to problems with Internet gambling”)
[hereinafter NGISC, ch.5].
86
See NGISC, ch. 7, supra note 3, at 7-16.
87
Id. at 7-20. Only 1% of adolescents reported having gambled in a casino.
Id. Whether Internet casinos could equally restrict adolescents remains to be
seen.
88
See generally id. (describing various social problems associated with
gambling). Of course, this assumes that the removal of casinos has the opposite
effect as the opening of new casinos. Another issue with this analysis is that
problem gamblers are the least likely group to be deterred by additional
transaction costs due to addiction. Currently, there is no empirical data to assess
whether the UIGEA has successfully decreased problem gambling.
83
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people that have access to Internet gambling, the less social costs
the United States should suffer from Internet gambling.
Although the UIGEA does not criminalize Internet gambling at
the user level, the UIGEA does create higher access costs because
gamblers are forced to find ways around the UIGEA.89 A general
rule of economic theory is that higher transaction costs discourage
specific behavior.90 Therefore, in theory, the UIGEA discourages
Internet gambling by prohibiting the most convenient methods of
funding Internet gambling accounts, such as credit cards.91 Credit
cards are especially problematic due to the potential to quickly
accumulate debt beyond one’s means.92 By eliminating American
credit cards as a method of funding Internet gambling, the UIGEA
has increased the transactions costs of Internet gambling. As a
result, bankruptcies and excessive credit card debt should decrease.
To the extent that Americans stop or never start gambling over the
Internet due to these considerations, the UIGEA has been a
success.93
B. The Costs of Prohibition
There are two principal categories of costs: economic and
social. This section will consider each of these categories in order
to facilitate a comparison with the Proposed Bills.

89

Even if the UIGEA does not stop the dedicated Internet gambler from
funding an account, the increased difficulty involved with funding an account
will certainly deter the casual gambler.
90
See POSNER, supra note 16, at 1–13.
91
The UIGEA does not provide FTPs an exemption for credit cards. See
PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at § 4 (listing exemptions).
92
See generally NGISC, ch. 7, supra note 3 (describing financial and credit
issues associated with gambling).
93
Unfortunately, the UIGEA did not mandate any research to document
whether and how the bill was a success. As a result, the benefits of the UIGEA
are difficult to quantify, while the costs of the UIGEA are far easier to quantify.
Strikingly, nobody can accurately estimate how many people stopped gambling
over the Internet as a result of the UIGEA.
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1. Economic Costs
The UIGEA has particularly affected American FTPs. In the
context of a severe recession, the imposition of expensive
regulations decreases American FTPs’ global competitiveness.94
To avoid regulation, commercial customers have an incentive to
use foreign FTPs.95 Furthermore, Internet gambling customers that
use foreign accounts will be tempted to conceal gambling winnings
from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).96 IRS audits of
individuals often have trouble obtaining international bank
records.97 The UIGEA’s objective to tackle fraud and money
laundering, although well intentioned, has had the unintended
consequence of incentivizing crimes such as tax evasion.
In addition, American FTPs have lost revenue streams derived
from fund transfer processing fees.98 The Agencies estimate that
the cost to FTPs of complying with the PFUIG will surpass $100
million in just the first year, without specifying an upward
estimate.99 On the other hand, assuming a $6 billion domestic
94

See generally Miller, supra note 28 (arguing that U.S. legislation puts a
heavy burden on domestic FTPs, decreasing competitiveness).
95
There is no law that prohibits U.S. citizens and businesses from setting
up foreign bank accounts. Id. at 206–07. Indeed, customers will want to avoid
FTPs’ mistaken reasonable restrictions of legitimate transactions that have no
redress in law. Id. at 203. Furthermore, multinational banks with a presence in
the United States are in the uncomfortable position of taking measures to
comply with the UIGEA, while at the same time providing financial services for
legal Internet gambling clients abroad. See id. at 202–03.
96
See Mark Scott, UBS U.S. Tax Dispute: Who Are the Winners, BUS. WK.,
Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europeinsight/
archives/2009/08/ubs_us_tax_disp.html (describing an example of tax evasion in
which wealthy Americans took advantage of “Switzerland and its famous bank
secrecy rules”).
97
See id. The dispute revolves around whether America has a right of
access to the names of Americans potentially hiding vast sums of money from
the IRS in Swiss bank accounts. See id. After months of negotiations, UBS
released the names of about 4,450 American clients to the federal government.
Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Disclosed Offshore Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/global/18irs.html?_r=2&
hp. Some 10,000 people came forward voluntarily out of fear. See id.
98
See Miller, supra note 28, at 216.
99
See PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at 69397.
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Internet gambling industry, estimates of bank fees under a
regulatory framework would total $420 million.100 The difference
between these two numbers represents the total estimated loss to
American FTPs—a minimum of half a billion dollars.
Internationally, Internet gambling has become a recognized
service industry.101 Over 80 countries have legalized and regulated
the business.102 In 2003, the small island nation of Antigua, home
to the most Internet gambling companies in the world, filed a
complaint against the United States with the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) for instituting policies that constitute
illegal trade restrictions in violation of the 1994 General
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) treaty.103 In 2005, the
WTO ruled against the United States,104 and later affirmed the
decision on appeal in 2007.105 Although the GATS provides an
exception to free trade policies in order to protect public morals,
the WTO found that the United States’ laws treated traditional and
online gambling differently, which presented a free trade
violation.106 The WTO rejected the United States’ argument that
there is a moral distinction between online and traditional
gambling.107 In particular, the WTO noted that the IHA regulated
and legalized Internet gambling for domestic horseracing, but
excluded foreign competition.108
In response, the United States took the unprecedented step of
100

Miller, supra note 28, at 216.
Id. at 207.
102
Rich Cholodofsky, Internet Gambling Perplexes Officials, TRIBLIVE
(Jan. 15, 2006), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_413842.html.
The list includes many first world important allies such as England. See id.
103
Miller, supra note 28, at 207.
104
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 340–73,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.antiguawto.com/
wto/51_Antigua%20_WTO_Appellate_Body_Report_7Apr05.pdf.
105
See Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 7.1, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30,
2007), available at http://www.antiguawto.com/wto/72Article215Paneldecision.
pdf.
106
Roysen, supra note 39, at 885.
107
Id. at 884–85.
108
See id. at 885.
101
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unilaterally rescinding its GATS obligations with respect to
Internet gambling.109 This is especially alarming because of the
precedent it establishes. For example, China now has precedent to
unilaterally rescind its WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) obligations after recently losing a WTO
suit initiated by the United States. China’s infringement cost the
American entertainment industry an estimated $3.7 billion in lost
sales.110 The economic costs of the UIGEA will not be quarantined
to Internet gambling.
The WTO fiasco has been a financial boondoggle of epic
proportions. Although the United States must pay Antigua only
$21 million annually under the WTO’s order,111 the United States
has subsequently settled with other nations, some of whom are
powerful allies.112 For example, the European Union dropped its
WTO claim against the United States in exchange for undisclosed
benefits in other trade sectors.113 Commentators estimate that total
settlements, including cash and trade concessions, could total $100
billion.114 This number fails to capture losses to good will and
American political capital.
2. Social Costs
Once market leaders, publicly traded Internet gambling sites
109

Miller, supra note 28, at 208.
Lesley Cole, WTO Tells China It Must Do more to Combat Copyright
Infringement, VENTURES (Feb. 19, 2009), http://venturesdialogue.ca/mainlandchina/2009/634/.
111
Alex Binkley, Remote Gambling Legislation in the United States: A
Burden on the System, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 537, 546 (2008).
112
Miller, supra note 28, at 207–08 (stating that the U.S. government has
negotiated settlements with nations including Australia, Japan, and the European
Union).
113
Id. at 208. It is alarming that the U.S. has provided concessions to other
countries, but refuses to reveal the extent. Secrecy surrounding concessions,
whether trade or cash, begs the inference that the concessions are enormous, or
otherwise not in America’s best interests. This information is currently the
subject of a claim under the Freedom of Information Act. Sarah Polson,
Congressmen Request Trade Settlement Details, POKER LISTINGS (Apr. 2, 2008),
http://www.pokerlistings.com/frank-paul-request-gats-agreement-24836.
114
Miller, supra note 28, at 208.
110
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can no longer service the lucrative American Internet gambling
market.115 Publicly traded corporations are subject to increased
oversight, transparency requirements, and fiduciary duties to
shareholders.116 As a result, millions of American Internet
gamblers must now rely on private companies in notoriously
“under-regulated” countries.117 These companies refuse to publicly
divulge their financial or employment information. As a result of
lax oversight and government regulation, the industry has been
plagued by several high-profile cheating scandals.118 In the underregulated Internet gambling market, the players themselves must
uncover these nefarious plots because no specific regulations exist
to mandate security and fairness.119 Ironically, the UIGEA forced
Americans to switch from publicly traded, regulated, and secure
Internet gambling sites, to privately owned, under-regulated
sites.120 To consumers, the UIGEA has damaged the quality,
115

Bradley Vellarius, PartyPoker Leads Exodus of Public Companies out
of U.S., RGT ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.rgtonline.com/Article.cfm?
ArticleId=67868&CategoryName=Featured&SubCategoryName=.
116
See id.
117
PeterPaul Shaker, America’s Bad Bet: How the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Will Hurt the House, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 1183, 1200–01 (2007). Although no regulations existed at the
industry’s inception, even Antigua has promulgated vague regulations requiring
fairness. Tselnik, supra note 48, at 1639. There are no specific rules, however,
to ensure this result. Id. Thus, the term under-regulated is used instead of
unregulated.
118
See, e.g., ‘60 Minutes’ on Sunday: How Online Gamblers Unmasked
Cheaters, CNET NEWS (Nov. 26, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_310108293-93.html (elaborating on the Absolute Poker scandal in which poker
players themselves had to discover that a former employee could see everyone
else’s cards and stealing 1.6 million in the process because there was no
regulation to force gambling sites to stop cheaters); Gilbert M. Paul, Players
Gamble on Honesty, Security of Internet Betting, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/29/
AR2008112901679.html (noting the Absolute Bet cheating scandal over a four
year period inculcating the executives of the company).
119
’60 Minutes’ on Sunday, supra note 118.
120
Compare
ANNUAL REPORT 2008,
PARTYGAMING
(2008),
http://annualreport 2008.partygaming.com/?id=29369 (providing very detailed
information about the company’s business performance, financial statements,
and governance) [hereinafter PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008], and
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reliability and security of the services provided.
In addition, the UIGEA perpetuates the stranglehold of foreign
Internet gambling companies over the American market by
prohibiting domestic competition. As a result, Congress is unable
to enact further legislation to protect underage American gamblers,
which was a principal motivation behind the UIGEA. Most
Internet gambling companies, complying with the laws of their
own country, only attempt to limit customers under the age of
eighteen.121 The age checks that do exist are cursory at best. The
more stringent sites require a photocopy of a valid government
issued identification card indicating the user to be eighteen-yearsold.122 In the United States, state law governs age limits with
respect to gambling, which range between sixteen and twenty-one,
depending on the jurisdiction.123 In most states, the minimum
required age for casino gambling is twenty-one, which is three
years higher than in most other parts of the world.124 Thus, foreign
REPORTS
AND
ACCOUNTS,
888
HOLDINGS
(2008),
ANNUAL
http://miranda.hemscott.com/ir/888/pdf/2008_Annual_Report.pdf
(providing
various reviews and reports on the state of the company as well as information
on the company’s governance) [hereinafter 888 HOLDINGS], with POKERSTARS,
http://www.pokerstars.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (providing no company
information, not even its telephone contact number, on its website). PokerStars
is a privately held company. Pokerstars, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/
companies/pokerstars.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
121
Most Internet gambling sites require a minimum age of 18 to gamble.
See, e.g., PokerStars Responsible Gaming, POKERSTARS, http://www.pokerstars.
com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010); PARTY POKER, http://www.partypoker.com (last
visited Sept. 8, 2010).
122
See, e.g., Responsible Gaming, FULL TILT POKER, http://www.full
tiltpoker.com/realMoney.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (warning users that the
company employs software that looks at drivers licenses or other governmentissued identification in order to verify that players are at least 18 years old).
123
See I. Nelson Rose, Minimum Legal Age to Place a Bet, CASINO CITY
TIMES (June 15, 2000), http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/article/minimum-legalage-to-place-a-bet-966. The legal gambling age in America varies precipitously.
See id. Most states allow gamblers to buy lottery tickets at 18 and enter casinos
at 21. See id. However, in a bizarre twist, Maine only requires a legal age of 16
to gamble in casinos, but requires gamblers to be 18 for the lottery. See id.
124
Great Britain allows 16 year olds to play slots and the lottery. James
Chapman, Raise the Gambling Age to 18, say Tories, MAIL ONLINE (July 6,
2007), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-466791/Raise-gambling-age-18-
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Internet gambling companies have little incentive to screen for
underage American gamblers between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
On the other hand, the Regulation Bill, proposed by
Representative Barney Frank, offers a framework to license and
regulate the online gambling industry.125 The Regulation Bill
currently has seventy cosponsors,126 and the Financial Services
Committee has approved the bill.127 The Regulation Bill does not
repeal the UIGEA; rather, it provides an exemption for all Internet
gambling operations that first obtain a federal license.128 For all
unlicensed foreign Internet gambling, the UIGEA would continue
to prohibit restricted transactions.129 In addition, state governments
that do not wish to participate may opt out.130 Unlike today’s
online gambling industry, the opt-out would likely be honored by
regulated domestic Internet gambling companies on penalty of
fines.131 The U.S. government would actually collect these fines
because the bill resolves the jurisdictional problems.132
In addition, the Taxation Bill, proposed by James McDermott
say-Tories.html. Canada, on the other hand, requires gamblers to be 19 in some
provinces and 18 in others. Reno Rollins, Gambling in Canada: Canadian
Betting and Casino Laws, WORLD GAMBLING REVIEW, http://www.world
gamblingreview.com/gambling/canada/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
125
Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. (2009).
126
H.R. 2267: Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=h111-2267 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
127
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE (July 27, 2010, 10:00 AM),
http://financialservices.house.gov/Hearings/hearingDetails.aspx?NewsID=1340.
The Financial Services Committee approved the Regulation Bill with numerous
amendments. See id. This Note incorporates those amendments.
128
See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. § 5383(b) (2009).
129
See id.
130
Id. § 5386(a).
131
Id. § 5386(c).
132
Id.

Is the Deck Stacked Against Internet Gambling?

251

and cosponsored by Barney Frank, operates in tandem with the
Regulation Bill.133 The Taxation Bill taxes licensed Internet
gambling companies, charges fees for the licensing process, and
ensures that gamblers’ winnings are documented for tax
purposes.134 Together, the Proposed Bills tax, license and regulate
domestic Internet gambling companies. This section will
categorically evaluate the costs and benefits of the Proposed Bills.
A. The Benefits of the Proposed Alternatives
The Proposed Bills would bestow several benefits to American
government, companies and citizens. Part 1 examines how the
government would benefit through increased revenue and
oversight and Part 2 details the benefits to American companies
and citizens through increased revenue and employment
opportunities. Part 3 addresses the social benefits such as reduced
cheating and underage gambling. These categories facilitate a
comparison between the benefits of the UIGEA and the likely
benefits of the Proposed Bills.
1. Increased Government Revenue and Enforcement
Currently, foreign Internet gambling companies render
gambling services to Americans, but avoid paying American
taxes.135 As gross revenue and profits from Americans
participating in Internet gambling continue to increase in real
terms, lost government revenue in the form of unpaid taxes is also
increasing.136 An independent 2008 PricewaterhouseCoopers
report estimates that the U.S. government would collect nearly $40
133

Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R.
2268, 111th Cong. (2009).
134
Id. §§ 4491, 6050X.
135
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ESTIMATE OF FEDERAL REVENUE
EFFECT OF PROPOSAL TO REGULATE AND TAX ONLINE GAMBLING (2008),
available at http://www.safeandsecureig.org/media/pwctaxanalysis.pdf (noting
the American government would reap 56% of additional estimated revenue from
individual income taxes).
136
See supra Part II.B.1. The federal government loses tax revenue from
both foreign Internet gambling companies and individual Americans.
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billion in revenue over the next 10 years from a regulated Internet
gambling market, assuming all states opt in.137 Individual income
taxes, which are automatically reported to the IRS, would
constitute 56% of the estimated $40 billion in additional
government revenue.138 The Proposed Bills further mandate that
licensed Internet gambling companies maintain and submit
detailed records to the IRS, including each gambler’s personal
information, gross winnings, gross losses, gross wagers, net
winnings, and withheld taxes.139 No longer would the government
rely on the good faith tax filings of Internet gamblers. The
proposed requirements for Internet gambling are even more
stringent than those for traditional casinos, which should result in
lower enforcement costs and a larger gross taxable income.140
Under the Taxation Bill, the government would reap a 2%
annual tax on the total funds deposited by customers.141 To ensure
compliance, the Proposed Bills provide oversight and enforcement
mechanisms.142 For example, the Treasury Department
(“Treasury”) may perform audits to ensure that Internet gambling
companies maintain adequate bookkeeping.143 Failure to abide by
137

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 135. The report gives different
estimates for differing numbers of opt-in states. Id. Because the Regulation Bill
currently prohibits bets on sports other than horseracing, the numbers provided
are lower than if the Regulation Bill permitted all types of wagers. Id.
138
Id. This figure exposes the rate of personal income tax evasion. See id.
139
H.R. 2268 § 6050x(a)-(b).
140
See Nevada Gambling: What You Need to Know, LAS VEGAS 4
NEWBIES, http://lasvegas4newbies.com/chap10-1.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2010). Casinos report gambling winnings for these games to the IRS when a
player wins $1,200 or more from a bingo game or slot machine or if the
proceeds are $1,500 or more from a keno game. Id. There is no withholding or
reporting for table games in Nevada (such as blackjack, baccarat, craps, roulette
or other spinning wheel games) because the casinos do not know the amount of
the wager and are unable to determine taxable gain from winnings. Id. Thus
table game winners probably do not report their gambling profits to the IRS. Id.
The laws for traditional casinos change from game to game, and also vary from
state to state. Keeping abreast of these laws for the average gambling customer
is nearly impossible.
141
See H.R. 2268 § 4491(a).
142
See, e.g., Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. §§ 5383(k)(1)–(2) (2009).
143
See id. Internet gambling companies carry the financial burden to
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these rules may result in penalties ranging from a maximum of
$100,000 to revocation of the gaming license.144 Although
$100,000 is too low, the license itself would be worth millions in
annual profits for a market leader, and thereby incentivize
compliance.
Faced with state and federal budget crises,145 states have
flocked to increase taxes and government revenue from traditional
gambling.146 For example, “[i]n Ohio, Governor Strickland
reversed his stance on video slots at racetracks based on a
‘conservative’ estimate that the new machines would net more than
$760 million to the state.”147 California has considered proposals to
initiate an intrastate online poker market.148 Pennsylvania, seeing
an opportunity to capture gambling revenue from Atlantic City,
opened a new casino in Bethlehem.149 If state governments collect
billions of dollars in annual revenue from traditional gambling,
why prohibit Internet gambling that offers the same games?
In addition, the Regulation Bill remedies the current
jurisdictional problems by compelling foreign Internet gambling
sites to subject themselves to U.S. jurisdiction.150 Internet
produce and deliver all required documents. Id. § 5383(k)(2)(B).
144
Id. § 5383(i)-(l).
145
See, e.g., Claire Suddath, Spotlight: California’s Budget Crisis, TIME,
July 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910985,00.
html; Lori Montgomery, Federal Budget Deficit to Exceed $1.4 Trillion in 2010
and 2011, WASH. POST, July 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/23/AR2010072304101.html.
146
Ian Urbina, States Face Drop in Gambling Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/10gambling.html?hp.
147
Id.
148
Dan Cypra, California Intrastate Online Poker Update, POKER NEWS
DAILY (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.pokernewsdaily.com/california-intrastateonline-poker-update-4537/. The UIGEA specifically exempts intrastate Internet
gambling. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §
5362(10)(B)(i) (West 2010).
149
Dice Now Rolling at Sands Casino, 69 NEWS, (July 18, 2010),
http://www.wfmz.com/lehighvalleynews/24302372/detail.html. While states
compete with one another to capture the largest share of gambling revenue, the
federal government squanders potential gambling revenue to foreign nations
through the UIGEA. See supra Part II.B.1.
150
See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2268, 111th Cong. § 5383(c)(2)(E) (2009).
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gambling companies will have to “maintain all facilities within the
United States for processing of bets or wagers made or placed from
the United States.”151 Even if some facilities are located abroad,
licensees are subject to administrative summonses to produce
records and data within 500 miles of the licensee’s place of
business in the United States.152 The Treasury would not have to
travel internationally to oversee Internet gambling operations.
By requiring Internet gambling companies to submit to United
States jurisdiction, the federal government would be able to
enforce compliance with state opt-outs, age requirements and other
state specific requirements.153 Regulators would be able to
determine the gambler’s physical location and age by, for example,
cross-referencing information from governmental databases with
the customer’s credit history.154 In contrast, under the UIGEA,
foreign Internet gambling companies do not even attempt to
comply with American law.155 The Proposed Bills provide
sanctions for non-compliance, thereby avoiding the current
situation in which Internet gambling companies flagrantly
“ignor[e] and circumvent[] the State laws.”156

151

Id. amend. 8, § 5383(k)(1)(D) (as offered by Rep. John Campbell,
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010), accord id. amend. 16, (as offered
by Rep. Roger Sherman, Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).
152
See id. § 5383(k)(2)(A). The United States is not responsible for any
expenses incurred by Internet gambling companies in compliance with these
summonses. Id. § 5383(k)(2)(B).
153
See id. § 5386(a).
154
SAFE AND SECURE INTERNET GAMBLING INITIATIVE, REGULATED
INTERNET GAMBLING AND AGE-VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES EFFECTIVE IN
COMBATING UNDERAGE INTERNET GAMBLING (2007), available at
http://www.safeandsecureig.org/media/underagerelease.pdf. The technology has
advanced to the point where given access to governmental databases, such as the
DMV and Social Security Administration, the government can realistically
require effective age and residency verifications. See id.
155
See supra Part II.B.1.
156
152 CONG. REC. S11045-01 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Jon Kyl), available at 2006 WL 3330257. Ironically, this quote from Senator
Kyl comes from the UIGEA’s legislative history. Senator Kyl lamented foreign
Internet gambling companies flagrantly disregarding state law. See id. Now,
foreign Internet gambling companies flagrantly disregard both federal and state
law. See supra Part I.
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2. The Benefit to Private American Companies
The Proposed Bills would pave the way for an American
takeover of the Internet gambling service industry. Under this
framework, American Internet gambling companies would serve
the majority of the domestic market and compete for a share of the
foreign market.157 To achieve these ends, the Regulation Bill
excludes the current foreign Internet gambling market leaders and
their executives from eligibility to obtain a license.158 No person or
company may obtain an Internet gambling license that has
previously committed a felony or is delinquent in filing any federal
or state tax returns.159 In particular, the Regulation Bill provides
that any person, company or affiliate that accepted a bet from a
person located inside the United States after the enactment of the
UIGEA, or provided financial assistance to that end, is ineligible to
obtain a license.160 All foreign private Internet gambling
companies currently accepting American wagers clearly satisfy
these criteria.161 The bill also delegates broad discretionary power
to the Treasury to deny applications in order to “protect the public
trust.”162 If passed, the Proposed Bills would capture a multibillion
dollar industry for American companies.
PartyGaming, the former Internet poker market leader publicly
traded on the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) and located in
Gibraltar, recognized the possibility that the United States may
regulate the online gambling market. PartyGaming responded by
negotiating a $105 million settlement with the U.S. Attorney’s
157

As opposed to the current situation in which $6 billion flow directly to
foreign companies. See supra Part II.A.
158
See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. § 5383(d)(3)(D) (2009) (barring
applicants who are delinquent in filing taxes owed to the U.S.).
159
Id. § 5383(d)(3)(C)-(D).
160
Id. amend. 15, § 5383(d)(3)(E)-(G) (as offered by Rep. Spencer Bachus,
Rep. Michele Bachman, Members, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).
161
See id. In addition, publicly traded foreign Internet gambling companies
failed to pay taxes to the American government for services provided to
American customers before the enactment of the UIGEA. Grahmann, supra note
11, at 166.
162
See H.R. 2267 § 5383(d)(5).

256

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

office in New York for prior actions contrary to American law.163
In return, the United States agreed to refrain from prosecuting the
company or its executives.164 Commentators speculate that the
online gambling giant is attempting to fulfill the obligations under
the Regulation Bill in order to be eligible to obtain an American
online gambling license.165 Other Internet gambling companies do
not share the optimism of PartyGaming, and assume that if Internet
gambling is regulated, licenses will be limited to American
gambling leaders such as Harrah’s and MGM.166 The mere
possibility that Congress will pass the Regulation Bill, and
PartyGaming could share in the action, has generated over $100
million in government revenue.
Moreover, the regulation of Internet gambling companies
would create thousands of skilled domestic jobs.167 In addition to
computer programmers, Internet gambling companies employ
marketers, customer service representatives, lawyers, and
technicians.168 In 2008, PartyGaming employed 1,191 people169
163

Pfanner, supra note 7.
Id.
165
Id.
166
See Jon Parker, PartyGaming, 888 and America: Different Strokes,
EGAMING REVIEW (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.egrmagazine.com/features/
261757/feature-partygaming-888-and-america-different-strokes.thtml. In the late
90’s, MGM ran an Internet gambling site successfully in the hope that America
would change its stance towards the industry. When it became clear America
would take steps to prohibit the industry, MGM decided it was not worth the
legal risk and potential public relations fallout and shut down its operations.
DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION AND THE
INTERNET 185 (William R. Eadington ed., 2005); Lisa M. Bowman, MGM
Mirage Shutters Online Casino, CNET NEWS (June 4, 2003, 11:45 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1026_3-1013085.html. American companies already
have the expertise to manage the industry efficiently.
167
PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 120, at 67
(exemplifying an Internet gambling company with robust employment
opportunities that, if forced to move to America, would employ thousands of
Americans).
168
Id. at 65–67.
169
Id. at 67. Comparing the employment statistics from before and after the
passage of the UIGEA, PartyGaming only employed 200 less employees, a drop
of less than 20%. Id. at 69. This data suggests that to run an Internet gambling
site correctly, a company needs several hundred employees, thereby providing
164
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despite the fact that the UIGEA eviscerated 58% of its stock value
at the end of 2006.170 Similarly, 888 Holdings, which is also
publicly traded and based out of Gibraltar, employed 931 people in
the 2008 fiscal year.171 The Regulation Bill capitalizes on the
potential for job creation and requires that the majority of all the
employees, officers and affiliated business entities of licensed
Internet gambling corporations be American citizens or
residents.172
The industry will also generate opportunities in business
sectors outside of Internet gambling.173 For example, 888 Holdings
spent $80.2 million on marketing in 2008.174 A regulated Internet
gambling industry disperses profits and employment opportunities
to diverse business sectors. Contrary to some commentators’
assertions,175 the Internet gambling industry provides robust
employment opportunities, training programs and competitive
salaries.176 Considering the current high unemployment rates,177
the United States should be proactive in attracting high paying,
skilled employment opportunities.
Additionally, American FTPs would benefit from the proposed
relatively stable employment regardless of market fluctuations.
170
Vellarius, supra note 115.
171
888 HOLDINGS, supra note 120, at 31–50.
172
Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend. 16, § 5383(k)(1)(C)–(F) (as offered by
Rep. Roger Sherman, Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). This
section will be null and void if the WTO rules that it violates free trade
agreements. However, after the unilateral withdrawal from GATS, and the large
settlement payments that resulted, the WTO would have to find a violation of
some other agreement. See supra Part II.B.1.
173
See Miller, supra note 28, at 202, for a discussion of how banks will
benefit from licensing and regulating online gambling.
174
See 888 HOLDINGS, supra note 120, at 14.
175
See, e.g., Grahmann, supra note 11, at 165–66 (noting that one Internet
gambling site startup employed just seventeen people compared to the
traditional and highly capitalized Harrah’s opening in New Orleans employing
4,259).
176
See PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 120, at 65–67.
177
See BUREAU OF LABOR AND STATISTICS, NEWS RELEASE: THE
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—AUGUST 2010 (Sept. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. The rate has hovered around
10%. See id.
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legislation. Licensing and regulating the Internet gambling industry
would increase American FTPs’ global competitiveness and
profitability by mitigating the financial costs of the UIGEA.178
Americans, who currently make up a substantial amount of Internet
gamblers throughout the world,179 would have a large incentive to
gamble with American online gambling companies due to better
security and ease of access to the services. American customers
would use American FTPs’ to process fund transfers.180 FTPs will
collect fees conservatively estimated at $420 million.181 In order to
address concerns regarding excessive debt through the use of
credit, the Regulation Bill continues the UIGEA’s prohibition on
the use of credit cards for Internet gambling.182
Despite these financial benefits, FTPs would still incur costs to
comply with the provisions of the UIGEA. The UIGEA cannot be
repealed because if Congress repeals the UIGEA and enacts the
Proposed Bills, established foreign Internet gambling companies
would compete equally with licensed domestic Internet gambling
companies. Under the Proposed Bills, domestic companies would
incur federal licensing fees, taxes and regulations that foreign
private companies would not.183 Therefore, without protection
from unlicensed foreign competition, federally licensed Internet
gambling companies would be at a significant competitive
disadvantage, and the newly created domestic Internet gambling
industry would be destined to fail. Therefore, if Congress passes
the Proposed Bills, Congress cannot repeal the UIGEA as applied
178

The bills would increase banks global competitiveness by at least half a
billion dollars a year. See supra Part II.B.1.
179
See Gale, supra note 4, at 534.
180
Customers will most likely use debit cards to fund Internet gambling
accounts because they are the most convenient method other than credit cards,
which are prohibited under the Proposed Bills. Internet Gambling Regulation,
Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend. 12,
§ 5388(a) (as offered by Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Services Comm.,
July 28, 2010).
181
See Miller, supra note 28, at 216.
182
H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend. 12, § 5388(a) (as offered by Rep.
Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). The bill
provides a grandfather exception for persons already licensed under the IHA.
See id. § 5388(b)(1).
183
See supra Part III.A.1.
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to unlicensed Internet gambling companies.
3. Social Benefits: Increased Security and Responsible Gaming
The Regulation Bill requires Internet gambling companies to
adequately protect customers.184 No longer would foreign Internet
gambling companies “self-regulate.”185 Companies would lose
their license or face civil fines for failing to take “appropriate
safeguards to protect the privacy and security of any person
engaged in Internet gambling.”186 To obtain a license, companies
must create a detailed plan to guarantee that games are fair.187 To
ensure strict adherence to these vetted plans, the Treasury may
issue summonses to inspect books, records and data of Internet
gambling companies.188 The Treasury would also test Internet
gambling code to ascertain whether measures taken to protect
security and eliminate cheating are adequate.189 By bringing
Internet gambling under government control, customers’ would
benefit from enhanced security.
In addition, the Regulation Bill would compel companies to
maintain mechanisms to combat “fraud, money laundering, and
terrorist finance.”190 Currently, the UIGEA does not stop money
laundering through privately owned foreign Internet gambling
companies if players use foreign FTPs. Moreover, the money, once
deposited in a foreign bank account, can be wired to a domestic
bank account, without violating the provisions of the UIGEA.191
184

Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act, H.R. 2268, 111th Cong. § 5383(g) (2009).
185
Some commentators have suggested that Internet gambling companies
have implemented significant security, privacy protection and problem gambling
support policies through “self-regulation.” E.g., Valasek, supra note 27, at 774–
80. However, the efficacy of such regulation is highly dubious given the
cheating scandals and rampant tax evasion prevalent today. See supra Parts
II.B.2, III.A.3.
186
H.R. 2268 §§ 5383(g)(7), (i)(l) (2009). The Treasury would be
responsible for promulgating additional regulations. Id. § 5383(k)(1)(B).
187
Id. § 5383(c)(2)(D)(ii).
188
See id. §§ 5383(k), 5384(b).
189
Id. § 5383(k)(1)(F).
190
Id. § 5383(g)(5).
191
See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5361
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The Regulation Bill attacks money laundering more effectively by
granting the federal government access to the paper trail.192
Accordingly, the United States would gain a considerable
advantage in the battle against money laundering.
Additionally, the Regulation Bill levies penalties against
individuals who cheat in Internet gambling games.193 Those
convicted of using any type of cheating device may be
permanently barred from all Internet gambling sites and subject to
a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment.194 These measures are
necessary because cheaters have not been punished adequately in
the past.195 Poker is especially vulnerable to cheating methods such
as individuals colluding, using multiple aliases at one table, or
dumping chips in tournaments.196 However, Internet poker
companies currently have an incentive to conceal breaches of
security rather than undertake potentially expensive and
embarrassing regulatory mechanisms to minimize cheating. The
penalties under the Regulation Bill address these perverse
incentives.
To obtain a license, applicants must submit a proposed
program to prohibit underage gambling, provide responsible
gaming materials, and enact regulation as the Treasury, state

(West 2010) (providing no mention of a prohibition in bank to bank wire
transfers).
192
H.R. 2268 § 5383(k).
193
Id. § 5390.
194
Id. Cheating is defined broadly including hacking the system code,
colluding with other players or using any device to obtain an advantage with the
intent to defraud a licensee or other player. Id.
195
See ABSOLUTE POKER SCANDAL, http://www.absolutepokerscandal.
com/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (describing a cheating scandal implicating
employees at an online poker site, which was not uncovered by authorities, but
by other players). See also supra Part II.B.1.
196
See Cheating in Online Poker, TIGHT POKER, http://www.tight
poker.com/online_poker_cheating.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (defining
collusion as when two players act in concert around one poker table). Using
multiple aliases happens when one player controls what appears to be several
players around one table. Id. Chip dumping occurs when one player purposely
loses his chips to another player in a tournament, which gives the remaining
player a significant advantage. Id.
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regulator, or tribal regulatory board mandates.197 For example, to
help combat problem gambling, the Treasury would require
Internet gambling companies to maintain a privacy-protected
national “List of Persons Self-Excluded from Gambling
Activities.”198 Moreover, to begin gambling, players must
electronically submit maximum loss limits by the hour, day, week,
or month, at the discretion of the player.199 Upon, reaching this
preordained amount, licensee sites may not honor any gambling
winnings or losses.200 Gamblers who have outstanding child
support payments would be automatically excluded from Internet
gambling sites.201 These measures would help minimize some of
the social costs of problem gambling.
The Regulation Bill also establishes the legal Internet gambling
age at 21 in order to avoid disparate state laws and promote
effective monitoring of underage gamblers.202 Further, the
Regulation Bill prohibits advertisements that target minors and
provides for sanctions, including the revocation of the license
and/or a fine, for a licensee “whose minor protection software,
mechanisms, and other systems are found to be insufficiently
effective.”203 To properly monitor compliance with these
provisions, the Regulation Bill requires annual reports on the status
of Internet gambling regulation, including the efficacy of
protections against underage and problem gambling.204 The
Regulation Bill also provides regulators the power to investigate
licensees to enforce these regulations.205 These provisions would
197

See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. § 5384(b) (2009).
198
See id. § 5384(c).
199
Id. amend. 8, § 5384(b)(1)(G) (as offered by Rep. John Campbell,
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).
200
Id. § 5384(c).
201
Id. amend. 13(a), § 5384(b)(3) (as offered by Rep. Barney Frank,
Chairman, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).
202
Id. amend. 8, § 5384(b)(1)(B) (as offered by Rep. John Campbell,
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).
203
Id. amend. 11, § 5384(p) (as offered by Rep. Melissa Bean, Rep. Mary
Jo Kilroy, Members, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).
204
See id. § 3(b)(5).
205
Id. § 5383(o).
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help minimize underage gambling.
To further address the social costs of Internet gambling, the
federal government could use the billions of dollars in additional
revenue from Internet gambling to finance programs designed to
ameliorate the social costs of Internet gambling. Currently, the
federal government does not fund any programs or research for
problem gambling.206 Representative Jim Moran recently proposed
the first attempt by federal legislators to understand and attack this
problem.207 However, the bill provides that “it is the sense of the
Congress that every state should contribute a percentage of its
revenue from gambling [to the program].”208 States are unlikely to
comply with “senses of Congress” absent federal authority to
compel states to act. Without adequate funding, meaningful
research and programs have not been developed. In contrast, the
Regulation Bill requires the public availability of detailed statistics
and logs on gambling behavior.209 The Proposed Bills provide the
funds, tools, and knowledge necessary to tackle social costs
particular to Internet gambling.
B. The Costs of Regulation
Community groups and activists often oppose the construction
of new casinos.210 Traditional casinos tend to attract crime and
206

See Terry Goodwin, U.S. Government Tackles Problem Gambling in
New Legislation Proposal, CASINO GAMBLING WEB (June 18, 2009),
http://www.casinogamblingweb.com/gambling-news/onlinecasino/us_government_tackles_problem_gambling_in_new_legislation_proposa
l_51419.html.
207
See Comprehensive Problem Gambling Act of 2009, H.R. 2906, 111th
Cong. (2009).
208
See id. § 7 (emphasis added).
209
H.R. 2267, amend. 17, § 5383(k)(4) (as offered by Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy,
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). This database would be
enormously helpful to properly assess the effects of Internet gambling.
Currently, researchers must use foreign databases and educated guesses to
determine the extent of the Internet gambling market. Anonymous publicly
disseminated Internet gambling information would facilitate an analysis of the
precise social and economic costs and benefits associated with this industry.
210
See, e.g., Michael Levinson, Church Facing Uphill Fight on Casino,
BOSTON.COM (Aug. 12, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/
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social ills such as drunk driving, prostitution, bankruptcies,
personal debt, and cheating.211 Problem gamblers accumulate an
average of $55,000 to $90,000 of debt.212 After casinos opened in
Atlantic City total crimes increased by 100%.213 If Internet
gambling follows comparable trends, every community in the
United States could suffer a similar increase of social costs.
Although Internet casinos can avoid some of the crime normally
associated with traditional casinos—such as prostitution, drunk
driving and petty theft, because Internet gambling does not require
a physical presence—regulated Internet gambling would likely
increase problem gambling and underage gambling, perhaps even
at a rate higher than traditional gambling.214
Problem gambling is a serious condition that affects not just the
gambler, but also his social network.215 Although the industry is
new and statistics are scarce, common sense dictates that increased
access to gambling services would increase the incidence of
problem gambling. However, because many Americans already
have access to gambling, either traditional gambling or illegal
foreign Internet gambling, problem gambling is unlikely to
increase significantly. Nevertheless, increased rates of problem
gambling, and the strain on the community, are among the most
serious social costs of the Proposed Bills.
Internet gambling could increase social costs in other ways as
well. For example, the anonymity of Internet gambling provides
underage gamblers an opportunity to circumvent age
restrictions.216 Unlike traditional casinos, there is no physical
2007/08/12/church_facing_uphill_fight_on_casino/.
211
See NGISC, ch.7, supra note 3.
212
GAMBLING FACTS AND STATISTICS, http://www.overcominggambling.
com/facts.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
213
Id.
214
See NGISC, ch. 5, supra note 85.
215
See NGISC, ch. 7, supra note 3, at 7-18 (stating that those who suffer
from problem gambling engage in behavior that is destructive to their families,
their work, and even their communities).
216
See NGISC, ch. 5, supra note 85, at 5-4 to 5-5. It is important to note
that while the UIGEA relies almost exclusively on this report, the NGISC’s
conclusions are not derived from empirical research on trends in Internet
gambling. For example, the conclusion that underage gamblers are at particular
risk comes from the observation that young people use the Internet more
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inspection of a state issued identification. Should new technology
prove unable to adequately detect underage gamblers,217 Internet
gambling may fuel problem gambling and addiction at young ages.
Although age detection technology has progressed significantly
since the National Gambling Impact Study,218 the potential for
underage gamblers to wager over the Internet is another social cost
that weighs against regulating Internet gambling. However, it is
important to recognize that while the provisions of the Regulation
Bill may not detect every underage gambler, the UIGEA has no
provision to specifically prevent underage gambling. Certainly,
underage gamblers must make up some portion of the estimated $6
billion Americans currently gamble over the Internet.
In addition, the Proposed Bills would likely further injure
foreign relations. Although the United States has already rescinded
its GATS obligations with regard to Internet gambling, the
Proposed Bills are protectionist policies.219 In response, foreign
nations may erect trade barriers in other trade sectors to
counterbalance these impediments to the free market. Depending
on the severity of international reaction and damage to
relationships with allies, this cost may be enormous from both a
financial and social aspect.
Finally, there is the unquantifiable moral objection. The
objection is unquantifiable because no benefit, no matter how
extraordinary, can outweigh the moral objection.220 Those who see
frequently. Id. at 5-4. The NGISC does not address whether age verification
through regulation would better protect against underage gambling. See id.
217
Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend 8, §5384(b)(1)(A) (as offered by Rep. John
Campbell, Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). Although the
Regulation Bill opens real time government databases to Internet gambling
companies for age verification purposes, the technology has yet to be tested.
Further, it is easy to conceive of ways that minors would be able to circumvent
rules because Internet gambling never requires a personal physical verification
of the identification.
218
Id. (allowing access to government databases).
219
Miller, supra note 28, at 208.
220
See, e.g., Michael K. Chung, Editorial, Gambling is Exploitative,
Immoral, THE TECH, Oct. 5, 1993, http://tech.mit.edu/V113/N47/chung.47o.html
(arguing that the money and increased tourism which could result from opening
casinos are not sufficient reasons for opening casinos because gambling is
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gambling as immoral will fundamentally object to the government
profiting from this “vice.”221 However, American governments
have profited from gambling since at least the early 1960s.222 If
gambling is truly immoral, then all gambling should be outlawed,
not just Internet gambling. Until that day, Congress should treat
Internet gambling and traditional gambling alike, and reject the
unreasonable argument that Internet gambling is immoral while
traditional gambling is not.223
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Further improvements to the Proposed Bills could increase the
benefits, decrease the costs and, thus, increase the net benefit to the
United States. First, the legislation should allocate a portion of the
government revenue derived from the Proposed Bills to programs
designed to combat social costs specific to Internet gambling. A
small percentage of the $40 billion in increased revenue over the
next ten years could fund meaningful progress towards reducing
underage and problem gambling.224 Indeed, the proposed bills
could fund the problem gambling research proposed by the
Comprehensive Problem Gaming Act.225 Furthermore, Congress
could fund research toward state of the art age verification and
problem gambling detection methods.226 Although the Treasury
may need some flexibility to enact these measures, a budget floor
should be set to adequately address the social costs of licensed
Internet gambling.
Second, the legislation should include language requiring
simply immoral; criticizing the government for exploiting citizens in the name
of increasing revenues).
221
See id.
222
See, e.g., 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 490 (15th ed. 2005)
(stating that the Louisiana lottery had acquired enormous profits by 1963).
223
This Note does not address unquantifiable arguments such as the desire
to maximize personal freedom and minimize government paternalism. Like the
moral argument, these arguments cannot be quantified as a cost or benefit.
224
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 135.
225
See supra Part III.A.iii.
226
See Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009,
H.R. 2268, 11th Cong. § 3(b)(5) (2009).
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licensees to obtain consent from foreign gamblers to submit to U.S.
jurisdiction. Although the Regulation Bill provides both civil and
criminal penalties for cheaters,227 absent gamblers’ consent to U.S.
jurisdiction, foreign cheaters are unlikely to be brought to justice.
American prosecutors would face the same jurisdictional problems
presented by foreign privately owned Internet gambling companies
violating the UIGEA.228 Alternatively, the Regulation Bill could
levy a large fine against Internet gambling companies for breaches
of security. Although individual cheaters would not be brought to
justice in this scenario, the fine would give companies a strong
incentive to proactively prevent cheating.
Third, Congress should raise the maximum civil fines levied on
Internet gambling companies for violating the provisions of the
Regulation bill. In 2008, PartyGaming posted almost half a billion
dollars in revenue and nearly $80 million in profit.229 The current
$100,000 maximum fine amounts to less than one day of profit.230
Thus, the Treasury’s two options for punishment are to revoke the
company’s license or invoke a paltry penalty. One option is too
severe and the other is too lenient. To address this issue, the
Treasury should have the discretion to levy fines of up to $10
million, while retaining the same mitigating factors.231
These suggestions should increase the benefits, decrease the
costs and eliminate loopholes to the Proposed Bills. The
modifications, which address the concerns that gave rise to the
UIGEA, would thus increase the net benefit of the Proposed Bills.
CONCLUSION
Despite the enactment of the UIGEA, Americans continue to
227

Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement
Act, H.R. 2267, 11th Cong. § 5390 (2009).
228
See supra Part I.
229
PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 120, at 104.
PartyGaming posts these figures even without access to the American market.
See Parker, supra note 166.
230
See H.R. 2267 § 5383(l)(1)(A).
231
See id. § 5383(l)(2)(D) (listing good faith, gravity of the violation and
size of the financial resources of the company as factors in determining the
penalty amount).

Is the Deck Stacked Against Internet Gambling?

267

gamble over the Internet and represent a significant portion of total
global Internet gambling revenue.232 This money goes directly
overseas, but the social costs of Internet gambling—such as
addiction and bankruptcy—remain in the United States. While the
UIGEA has unsuccessfully addressed these concerns by attempting
to prohibit Internet gambling, the Proposed Bills would capture the
benefits of the industry and develop regulations to minimize the
costs.
Financially, the Proposed Bills are unquestionably superior to
the UIGEA. The United States government would reap nearly $40
billion over the next ten years and private American companies
would compete for a multibillion dollar domestic Internet
gambling market. Eventually, licensed domestic Internet gambling
companies would make inroads into foreign Internet gambling
markets and increase the financial benefits to the United States.
The newly created domestic Internet gambling industry would
create skilled jobs and business opportunities in diverse sectors of
the economy such as advertising and marketing. Instead, the
United States now hemorrhages billions of dollars directly to
private illegal foreign Internet gambling companies. Furthermore,
American FTPs will spend an estimated $100 million to comply
with the PFUIG in just the first year of the PFUIG’s passage.233
On the other hand, it is less clear whether the Proposed Bills
will decrease or increase social costs and, if they do, by how much.
With respect to the security of gambling services, regulated
Internet gambling companies subject to punishment by the U.S.
government would be superior to under-regulated foreign
gambling companies. However, the Proposed Bills would increase
the numbers of American gamblers and, thus, probably increase
the numbers of underage and problem gamblers. The pivotal issue
is the extent to which the provisions of the Proposed Bills would
ameliorate these social costs. Although unknown numbers of
underage and problem gamblers currently exist under the UIGEA
and would exist under the Proposed Bills, the Proposed Bills
attempt to counteract these social costs, while the UIGEA does

232
233

Pfanner, supra note 7.
Supra Part II.B.1.
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not.234 Surely confronting these social costs and attempting a
solution is more desirable to ignoring the problem wholesale.
Unfortunately, even if Congress passes the Proposed Bills, the
absence of information with respect to the current social costs of
Internet gambling would provide no baseline with which to
compare whether the Proposed Bills have decreased or increased
these social costs such as problem gambling and underage
gambling.235
Over all, the benefits of the Proposed Bills far outweigh the
benefits of the UIGEA. Under either framework, millions of
Americans will gamble over the Internet. Under the UIGEA, the
United States reaps none of the benefits of Internet gambling but
retains the costs. On the other hand, under the Proposed Bills, the
United States would exploit the benefits and mitigate the
potentially higher costs of an increased domestic Internet gambling
market. With higher benefits and social costs that are addressed
instead of ignored, the Proposed Bills provide a larger net benefit
to the United States than does the UIGEA.
Internet gambling is not meaningfully different than traditional
gambling. Faced with an economic crisis, the federal government
should capture this multibillion dollar industry for the United
234

Compare supra Part II.B.2. (noting the lack of protection against
cheating and underage gambling under the UIGEA), with supra Part III.A.3.
(describing the provisions under the Proposed Bills designed to combat
cheating, money laundering, underage gambling, and problem gambling). Even
if Congress does not pass the Regulation Bill, Congress would be wise to
allocate resources towards combating the social costs of Internet gambling under
the UIGEA. See Comprehensive Problem Gambling Act of 2009, H.R. 2267,
111th Cong. (2009).
235
In the spring of 2011, England will release the results of its first national
survey on the prevalence of problem gambling since regulating Internet
gambling in 2005. See British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010, GAMBLING
COMMISSION,
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/research__consultations/research/bgps/
bgps_2010.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). England began keeping statistics in
2000. See British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2000, GAMBLING COMMISSION,
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/research__consultations/research/bgps/
bgps_2000.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). To the extent American problem
gambling trends are comparable to English trends, the study should be
informative on the effects regulating Internet gambling will have on problem
gambling in America.
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States. The successful implementation of Internet gambling
regulation by our international allies demonstrates the potential for
success domestically.236 The United States’ national interests are
best served by controlling this industry, reaping its benefits, and
effectively regulating it to minimize its costs.
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See generally GAMBLING COMMISSION, http://www.gambling
commission.gov.uk/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).

